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ABSTRACT Despite decades of scholarship on G.H. Mead (1863–1931), we are
still far from an adequate estimate of the full scope of his contributions. In this
article, I examine the standard caricature that portraits Mead as an essentially ideal-
ist thinker, without much to say on the ‘material conditions of reproduction’ of
modern industrialized societies. Focusing on Habermas’s version of this interpret-
ation, I try to show that if ‘science and democracy’ is a common theme amongst
classical pragmatists, Mead is the only of these to whom we owe a communicative
social theory that systematically connects science’s problem-solving nature to
democracy’s deliberative character by means of social psychology that establishes
the social nature of the human self. To suggest otherwise is to ignore that Mead’s
intellectual edifice is perhaps best described as a system in a state of flux, a struc-
ture that comprises three ever-evolving pillars: experimental science, social psych-
ology, and democratic politics.
KEYWORDS democratic politics, Dewey, experimental science, Habermas, Mead,
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Among sociologists all over the world, there is a widespread belief that ‘Mead’, the
sociological classic, is an intellectual reference for his seminal ideas on the social char-
acter of human subjectivity. George Herbert Mead’s book Mind, Self and Society
(1997 [1934]) is read as if comprising the essential of his social psychological ideas,
and is seen as a precursor for the symbolic interactionist sociological current that
emerged in the United States in the 1960s as an alternative to Talcott Parsons’s
structural-functionalism. As a consequence, Mead’s place in the sociological canon
is essentially due to his referential analysis of the human self, with little or nothing
to say about industrialization, war, politics. This article is aimed at showing that this
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image, however ingrained in the discipline’s self-understanding, does not corres-
pond to the truth.
This image of ‘Mead’ as a social psychologist solely concerned with the social
nature of the human self is no more than a reflection of a long story of anachronisms,
partial appropriations of his thought, and of the poor editorial situation of his writ-
ings. The history of the reception of Mead’s ideas comprehends a number of inter-
pretations that have reinforced this image. For instance, Mead’s social theory of
consciousness has been the inspirational motive of symbolic interactionism, a trad-
ition of sociological thought responsible for a notable amount of empirical studies,
and a recurrent presence in contemporary sociological treatises, most notably in
Jürgen Habermas’s The Theory of Communicative Action (1984 [1981], 1987
[1981]). In both cases, Mead is said to be responsible for original contributions on
the micro-level of social interaction. As I will try to show, this sort of reading makes
a crucial error: it overlooks the theoretical relevance of the insights Mead produced
in his often neglected writings on democratic politics, warfare, international relations,
and industrialization.
This last remark ties in with the way the structure of this article is conceived.
I shall start by discussing Habermas’s interpretation of Mead, arguably one of the
most influential readings of Mead in contemporary social theory. In my view, the
fundamental claim by Habermas that Mead had neglected the material aspects of
modern, industrial societies is misleading and, to a certain extent, a consequence of
Habermas’s strategy of theory building. My next step will be to offer a historically
minded reconstruction of Mead’s social and political thinking. The lack of a com-
plete edition of his writings left me with no choice but to undertake an archival
research at the George Herbert Mead Papers, held at the Department of Special
Collections at the Regenstein Library of the University of Chicago. Virtually all of
Mead’s major commentators have undertaken a certain amount of research there.1
In my case, in the course of a five-month stay I was able to unearth over 900 pages
of unpublished materials, comprising both items written by Mead and transcripts of
his classroom lectures.
In the first case, Mead’s numerous manuscripts on questions concerning
politics, war, and social reform were found to be particularly relevant. Overall,
these items amount to approximately 250 pages. Together with the official
records of Mead’s participation in several organizations oriented to social reform
activities,2 these unpublished materials – which exceed in length the published
articles on the same subject – highlight the need to reassess the relative import-
ance of this dimension within the framework of his intellectual edifice. Mead
wrote extensively up to the very end of his career on democratic politics, social
reform, and ethics. In these writings, he mobilizes the conceptual apparatus of his
social psychology in order to put forth a scientific analysis of political and moral
phenomena, and as such it is an integral part of his system of thought. Any recon-
struction of Mead’s intellectual enterprise that fails to acknowledge this fact
understates an enduring and constitutive feature of his thinking, as well as one of
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his most relevant contributions to contemporary social and political theory. An
additional claim I wish to make has to do with the differences between Mead and
Dewey that have not yet been fully appreciated. A case in point refers to the social
theoretical foundations of the pragmatists’ moral and political theories. From this
perspective, Mead’s ‘scientific social psychology’ can be seen as the social theor-
etical foundations of the pragmatists’ radical democratic theory that Dewey failed
to provide.
Habermas’s Mead: The Cost of Becoming a Classic
Habermas’s appropriation of American pragmatism is especially noteworthy since the
first generation of the Frankfurt School, in exile in the United States during the
1930s and 1940s, was particularly indifferent to the native currents of thought. Crit-
ical theorists such as Theodor Adorno and Max Horkheimer never seriously acknow-
ledged either Parsons’s 1937 The Structure of Social Action or John Dewey’s political
writings (Joas, 1993: 86). Unlike Hannah Arendt or Alfred Schutz, the relation-
ship between the critical theorists associated with the Frankfurt School and the
American social and political theorists was not a fruitful one. When seen in this light,
Habermas’s attempt to achieve a synthesis of the American and Frankfurt traditions
is of an exceptional nature. In particular, his attempt to draw on pragmatist philoso-
phy of science in the debate against positivism in the 1960s (Habermas, 1998
[1972]), his endeavors to reconcile Marxist democratic thought with American prag-
matism’s political insights (Habermas, 1986), and his paradigmatic shift from instru-
mental to communicative action and rationality (Habermas, 1984 [1981], 1987
[1981]) constitute long-term traits of his theoretical profile.
One has to admit that Habermas’s central theoretical concern is not the his-
tory of science, nor even the history of ideas, but a specific kind of interpretative
social science. His model of social science stands between a positivistic approach,
which denies the methodological uniqueness of the social and human sciences, and
a hermeneutical perspective, which questions the appropriateness of the notion of
science when applied to the humanities. As Habermas puts it in On the Logic of the
Social Sciences, this approach can be described as a ‘hermeneutically enlightened and
historically oriented functionalism’ (1996a [1967]: 187). The basic idea is that of
providing a normative reconstruction of the more advanced states of the learning
processes of modern capitalist societies in the light of which systemic disturbances
can be identified. This normative reconstruction is supposed to be grounded on a the-
ory of language, whose first versions appeared in the early 1970s (see, for example,
Habermas, 1970, 1991 [1976]), and was published in its most developed form in
Habermas’s magnum opus, The Theory of Communicative Action. With the publica-
tion of this two-volume book, Mead’s image in sociology changes dramatically. He
is no longer simply the first of the symbolic interactionists;3 he is one of the discip-
line’s founding fathers, to whom we owe the paradigm shift from purposive to
communicative action. The aim of this section is, then, to evaluate Habermas’s
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appropriation and criticisms of Mead,4 namely his alleged neglect of the processes
of ‘material reproduction of society’ and his lack of development of a theory of lan-
guage. Whether or not there are good reasons to level such criticisms at Mead is
what I wish to discuss in the following paragraphs.
The crucial turn in Habermas’s argumentation, in the passage from the first
to the second volume of this book, provides us with one of the most important
episodes of the history of the reception of Mead’s ideas into sociology. At the end of
the first volume, Habermas discusses what he designates as critical theory aporias,
whose most startling example was Adorno’s Negative Dialectics (1973 [1966]).
However, Habermas finds something positive in the difficulties met by the tradition
of critique of rationalization5 when he observes that ‘[t]here is something to be
learned from these problems; indeed they furnish us with reasons for a change of para-
digm within social theory’, and concludes that ‘[w]hereas the problematic of ration-
alization/reification lies along a “German” line of social-theoretical thought . . ., the
paradigm change that interests me was prepared by George Herbert Mead and Émile
Durkheim’ (1984 [1981]: 366, 399).
In the second volume of The Theory of Communicative Action, Habermas
begins his reconstruction of Mead’s social psychology by focusing on the latter’s
phylogenetic account of the emergence of language. Mead conceives of the concept
of ‘conversation of gestures’ as the evolutionary starting point that leads first to sig-
nal language and then to propositionally differentiated speech. Human language
evolves firstly as signal languages, which mark the transition from gesture-mediated
to symbolically mediated interaction, and secondly as the basis for normatively regu-
lated action. There are, however, problems with Mead’s account. According to
Habermas, Mead’s distinction between, on the one hand, symbolically mediated
interaction and, on the other hand, linguistically mediated and normatively guided
interaction is not adequate. In order to solve this difficulty, Habermas resorts to
Wittgenstein’s concept of rule. Habermas’s point is that the transition from gesture-
mediated to symbolically mediated interaction involves the ‘constitution of rule-
governed behavior, of behavior that can be explained in terms of an orientation to
meaning conventions’ (1987 [1981]: 16). In Habermas’s view, Mead does not give
the same weight to the three prelinguistic roots of the illocutionary power of speech
acts. Mead did realize that language was the primary mechanism of socialization
(which is linked to the emergence of norms and identities) and coordination of
action (which is related to the world of perceptible and manipulable objects), but
failed to inquire into the possibility of normative solidarity. As Habermas explains,
Mead ‘focuses on language as a medium for action coordination and for socializa-
tion, while leaving it largely unanalyzed as a medium for reaching understanding’
(1987 [1981]: 27). Thus Habermas focuses his attention on Mead’s ontogenetic
account of the origin of personal identities and of objective perception.
The outcome of this analysis, arguably one of the most sophisticated read-
ings of Mead’s theory of ontogenesis, is the critical remark that Mead ‘is moving in
a circle’ (Habermas, 1987 [1981]: 44). In Habermas’s view, Mead tries to explain
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the phylogenetic transition from symbolically mediated to normatively guided inter-
actions by resorting to a concept which figures only in his theory of ontogenesis,
namely the ‘generalized other’. It is in order to overcome this difficulty that
Habermas then turns to Durkheim’s theory of religion. This theoretical move, how-
ever, is not without problems. In particular, the way Habermas supplements Mead
and Durkheim’s proposals does not strike me as especially convincing. Although
Mead did not develop systematically a phylogenetic explanation for the ‘generalized
other’, if one takes into account Mead’s conception of science and social psychology
it is possible to trace back in the history of the human species the origin of such a
concept. In fact, Mead reconstructs the evolution of the human species in terms of
a constant and gradual increase of human rationality, based on the usage of vocal
gestures that in the course of evolution acquire symbolic meanings, and that leads
to, on the one hand, growing universality, abstraction, and impersonality (the Kantian
features, as it were, of the generalized other, as well as the attitude of the research
scientist and of the critical moral agent), and, on the other, an increasing trend
towards individuality, authenticity, and originality (Mead’s version of the Hegelian
dialectic of the recognition).6 In other words, the evolutionary framework within
which Mead develops what Habermas calls ‘social individuation’ contains the seeds
for a phylogenetic account of the ‘generalized other’.
When, some sixty pages later, Habermas returns to Mead, his purpose is to
assess the extent to which Mead’s contribution in fact supplements Durkheim’s
proposals. If Durkheim throws light on the phylogenetic origins of what Habermas
designates as the ‘linguistification of the sacred’, that is, the transfer of the societal
functions of cultural reproduction, social integration, and socialization from the
religious realm to the structures of communicative action, Mead provides the
explanation for these evolutionary trends from the perspective of socially individu-
ated human beings. In other words, Mead is the first author to acknowledge the
societal trend that Habermas calls the ‘communicative rationalization of the life-
world’ (1987 [1981]: 107). However, Habermas still has some reservations con-
cerning Mead’s approach. The first is related to the formalist character of Mead’s
analysis of the societal processes comprised in the rationalization of the lifeworld.
The second and more crucial reservation has to do with Mead’s alleged ‘idealism’.
Habermas turns to functionalism in order to avoid the ‘neglect of economics, war-
fare, and the struggle for political power’ (1987 [1981]: 110) which Mead sup-
posedly incurred given his ‘idealistic’ theoretical model.7 Habermas’s reservation
concerning the idealistic character of Mead’s theory of society stems from his more
general claim that Mead’s sole contribution to contemporary social theory is a the-
ory of the self that postulates the social character of human subjectivity. The point
I wish to stress is that Mead’s place in the canon was ultimately earned at the cost
of the neglect of the two other pillars comprised within his system of thought,
which I call the pillar of science and the pillar of democratic politics. The funda-
mental connection between science and democracy is thus forgotten. The remain-
der of this article will thus be devoted to the discussion of what Habermas accused
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Mead of having neglected – the pillar of politics – as well as, to a lesser extent, to
the rest of the edifice, an intellectual structure whose thematic organization and
systematic nature are ignored by most commentators. Some remarks are, therefore,
due on the exact scope and nature of this intellectual structure.
The systematic nature of Mead’s thinking is revealed as soon as one looks at
the different ways he relates science, social psychology, and politics. To begin with,
the psychological mechanism of ‘taking the role of the other’ can be seen operating
in the attitude of the research scientist, in the attitude of the social actor (from both
a phylogenetic and an ontogenetic viewpoint), and in the attitude of the citizen. On
the other hand, there are different kinds of social environments within which the
human self develops its activities by meeting problems and adapting to changing cir-
cumstances: the scientific community, the social group, and the political community.
These pillars are linked in other aspects too. Given the priority of the scientific pil-
lar, the two others can be seen as scientific approaches to specific problems, either
the problem of the social origins of the individual self, or the problem of the moral
and political organization of modern industrial societies. The relative importance of
the second pillar is reflected in a distinctively social psychological approach that is
mobilized to analyze, for instance, political phenomena. Finally, one can find a cat-
egorical conception of democracy in all layers of Mead’s writings. The notion of a
social order that is egalitarian, impartial, and open to participation and discussion
pervades all aspects of his system of thought, from the inner forum of conversation
to international relations between nation-states.
There are, then, multiple levels at which Mead’s conceptions of science,
social psychology, and politics intersect. What gives unity to this edifice is Mead’s
insistence on the communicative character of human rationality. While this is hardly
a new insight for anyone minimally familiar to Mead’s work, the fact remains that
there is not even one single remark in all the secondary literature on him concern-
ing his theoretical model of the various linguistic stages of development. As I will
later show, Mead’s remarks on the various ‘moods of language’ are not only closely
related to the way he conceives of deliberative democracy and communicative
ethics, but are also associated with his ontogenetic and phylogenetic theories.
Mead: Radical Democracy and the 
Method of Science
My aim in the following section is to discuss the theoretical domain Habermas
accused Mead of neglecting, the pillar of politics. This is the realm where Mead’s
endorsement of the pragmatist orientation to connect theory and practice most
clearly comes to the fore. As I will try to show, Mead wrote and published a sig-
nificant amount of essays on democratic politics, communicative ethics, social
reform, labour relations, immigration, and industrialization at the same time as he
participated in various voluntary organizations and social movements. A second
but related claim is that, in theoretical terms, Mead’s conceptions of science and
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of social psychology are systematically connected to his moral and political think-
ing. In a nutshell, if the notion of ‘reconstruction’ is a central element of Mead’s
conception of science as a problem-solving activity as well as of his four-staged
model of human action, the related idea of ‘social and moral reconstruction’ is the
cornerstone of his political and moral thinking.
In his seminal Uncertain Victory, James Kloppenberg asserts that these ideas,
‘moderate, meliorist, democratic, and sensitive to the possibility that no perfect
reconciliation of liberty and equality can be attained, are the consequences of prag-
matism for politics’ (1986: 194). Mead’s allegiance to this incremental, piecemeal
reformism accompanies him throughout his life. The systematic nature of Mead’s
thought, a feature demoted by many commentators, allows him to mobilize similar
formulations of the concept of ‘reconstruction’ in different problem-areas, slightly
adjusting its meaning to the field in question. Either by claiming that ‘[l]ife is a
process of continued reconstruction involved in the world as experienced’ (Mead,
1972 [1936]: 292), or by asserting the need for social reconstruction, Mead is sug-
gesting the same flexible and in-the-making worldview. What unites these different
formulations of the concept of reconstruction is Mead’s allegiance to the principles
of the method of modern experimental science. Hence the logical priority of the pil-
lar of science over the pillar of politics one finds in Mead’s intellectual edifice.
From an early stage in his life, Mead develops a critical political conscious-
ness, guided by radical democratic principles and oriented to the betterment of his
community. In fact, even before Mead started his academic career he was already a
concerned citizen with clear political allegiances. Unlike some commentators sug-
gest,8 Mead was never a Republican, having wholeheartedly supported the Democrat
President Woodrow Wilson. After a brief stay in Ann Arbor, Michigan, Mead even-
tually settled in Chicago, where he would be able to put into practice these projects
he shared with his friend Henry Castle, who unfortunately would not live long
enough to see it. Chicago was by that time a fast-growing metropolis that attracted
millions of immigrants from Europe and was one of America’s main poles of indus-
trial activity, a city undergoing a process of profound social change and economic
expansion. The risk of major social conflicts in such a modern industrial city was very
clear in the minds of all of those who, like Mead, shared a belief in the possibilities
of science to conduct human affairs. After being guaranteed an academic position at
the University of Chicago in 1894, Mead emerged as an intellectual with unmistak-
able radical democratic sympathies.
Mead’s civic engagement in reformist, voluntary activities was long and
varied. From his support of and writings on the social settlement movement,9 to
his involvement in the Immigrants’ Protective League (which he helped to found
in 1908), his participation on a citizens’ committee established to solve the so-
called ‘garment strike’ of 1910, and his long membership in the City Club of
Chicago (which he joined in 1906), there are numerous examples of his belief that
the ‘study and work’ of social and political reform should go hand in hand. While
Mead was engaged in these voluntary activities he kept developing his theoretical
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position on ‘intelligent social reconstruction’. As most first-generation modern
theorists, Mead too considers the best remedy for the ailments of modernity to be
the human activity that best represents that very modernity, that is, experimental
science. From the perspective of contemporary social theorists, though, this can
seem as a sign of overconfidence on the possibilities of science. As soon as one
takes into account Mead’s insistence on the internal connection between science
and democracy, what looks like a possible naïveté emerges as a critical program
aiming at articulating scientifically certain crucial social psychological insights and
democratic political principles. Behind this program one finds a communicative
theory of society that seeks to reconstruct the socio-linguistic roots of human
rationality in both phylogenetic and ontogenetic terms.
This can be seen as early as in the 1899 essay ‘The Working Hypothesis in
Social Reform’, where he rejects ‘utopian’ and ‘doctrinaire’ political doctrines, such
as socialism, in favor of a scientifically grounded social reformism. As Mead asserts,
in social reform ‘what we have is a method and a control in application, not an ideal
to work toward. As has been stated, this is the attitude of the scientist in the labora-
tory’ (1899: 369). In two unpublished manuscripts written in this period, Mead
addresses the conditions for intelligent social reconstruction in a period of rapid
modernization. On one of those occasions, Mead discusses the social and political
implications of the process of industrialization, wondering whether ‘we can ever
hold to any democracy consistently till we give every child a trained skill which shall
guarantee him an economic and social status’ (n.d.-b: 38). By giving priority to the
need for an informed citizenry, on the part of the community, over the need for
vocational training, on the part of the industrialists, Mead puts forth the radical
democratic claim that without concrete material equality of conditions, the abstract
theory of political rights is no more than an abstraction which benefits some at the
expense of the many. In another unpublished manuscript, the sociological notion of
‘social control’10 emerges as the political expression of the pragmatists’ ideological
commitment to intelligent social reconstruction. Mead, believing that ‘the most
effective government is through public opinion’ (n.d.-d: 7–8), posits in the social
cooperation through the exchange of rational arguments by a cognitively competent
and informed public opinion the solution for the value pluralism of modern mass
societies. Building on this assumption, his endorsement of a theory of communica-
tive ethics and a conception of deliberative democracy, which will be discussed later
in this section, are but the logical corollary of his commitment to the ideal of unco-
erced and informed dialogue. However, before I turn to Mead’s conception of rad-
ical democracy, I wish to address his involvement in the single most important
international event of his lifetime – the First World War.
Mead and the War
Indeed, the Great War constituted a challenge for the intellectuals and scientists of
the beginning of the 20th century. It is fair to say that a whole generation of social
JOURNAL OF CLASSICAL SOCIOLOGY VOL 7(3)298
291-314 JCS-082083.qxd  8/10/07  2:45 PM  Page 298
 at CAMBRIDGE UNIV LIBRARY on February 3, 2016jcs.sagepub.comDownloaded from 
thinkers, including sociology’s classic figures, was offered the chance of supersed-
ing particularistic and non-scientific prejudices in the name of scientific objectivity
and impartiality. Most of them, however, failed to meet that challenge (see, for
example, Joas, 2003: 55–81). In my view, this is not true of Mead. His wartime
personal correspondence and political writings, some of them still unpublished,
show us a social scientist deeply concerned with the humanitarian consequences of
war but willing to provide a scientific explanation for the causes and nature of that
human tragedy. In this respect, Mead’s social psychological explanation of the
fusion of the two phases of the self in patriotic moments is of particular relevance.11
Mead’s personal correspondence with Irene Tufts Mead, his daughter-in-
law, and son, Henry, right before and after America’s entry into the war shows, at
first, a profoundly distressed individual whose anti-militarism led to hope for a
pacific solution,12 and later someone increasingly convinced of the fairness of the
alliance of the values of democratic self-rule and labor rights against autocratic mili-
tarism.13 This change of opinion can also be identified in Mead’s published writ-
ings. Following the evolution of the events in Europe from 1914 to 1917, Mead
starts by expressing serious doubts about the war’s rationale in the 1915 ‘The
Psychological Basis of Internationalism’.14 For both personal and intellectual rea-
sons, Mead followed the evolution of the war with great attention and growing
concern.15 After the United States’ entry into the war on April 6, 1917, in a series
of newspaper articles published in the Chicago Herald in that summer, he shows a
different understanding of the war. Reiterating his lifelong anti-militarism, Mead
argues that the war had become a ‘war for democracy’ against the autocratic and
militarist German regime (see Mead, 1917).
Furthermore, and refuting Habermas’s claim that Mead had neglected the
material reproduction of modern societies, here we see Mead applying his theor-
etical outlook (in a way that also expresses his personal values and ideological com-
mitments) to the analysis of an example of the societal phenomenon of war. What
is a purely theoretical account of the process of fusion of the two phases of the
human self in Mind, Self and Society can be seen, in the above-mentioned 1915
article, being applied to the concrete example of patriotism, curiously enough an
alluded example that Morris’s editorial activity did not give us the chance of read-
ing.16 Indeed, in that article, Mead starts his analysis of the war in Europe by tak-
ing note of its ‘great spiritual dividends’ (1915: 604). Arguing along similar lines
as Simmel and Durkheim,17 he asserts that individual members of societies can fuse
into self-conscious nations in moments of exceptional emotional intensity. Like a
tide of national consciousness that sweeps across the body of citizens, these emo-
tional moments are as intense as they are brief. When these moments occur, Mead
contends, there is a fusion of the ‘I’ and the ‘me’: there is an absolute identifica-
tion between the individual self and the social group. The fusion of the individual
and the group is so complete that the individual can even lose himself ‘in the whole
group in some sense, and may attain the attitude in which he undergoes suffering
and death for the common cause’ (Mead, 1918: 598).
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Mead, however, is far from endorsing the irrationalist implications sug-
gested by this psychological phenomenon. On the contrary, his proposed solution
for settling international disputes comprises two elements drawn from his scien-
tific social psychology. Firstly, rejecting James’s assumption of a masculine fight-
ing instinct, Mead asks why reformist activities should be seen as ‘white-blooded’
and ‘feministic’, when actually they are a ‘vastly more intelligently conceived for-
mulation of the same patriotic principles’ (1915: 607). In Mead’s view, social and
political reform thus conceived is intrinsically internationalist since it gives prior-
ity to the interests of humankind over the interests of any particular state.
Secondly, both in the notion of self-reflexivity as the elemental mechanism for the
development of the self and in the idea of democratic self-rule as the basic condi-
tion for a meaningful group life, the same insight is suggested. Just as an individ-
ual depends on the existence of other human beings to exist, so the national
identity and the very life of a political community are dependent on the existence
of other nation-states. This is why Mead concludes this essay by stating that the
solution for the problem of militarism, chief cause of the conflict, is of a psycho-
logical nature. It lies in a change of attitude on the part of the states of the Central
Powers that would indicate the willingness to accept the fact that they are a but a
part of a vaster community of nations; this way, Mead believes, they would be able
to ‘regard the states and the communities of which they are the instruments, as
subject to and controlled by the life of the whole, not as potential enemies for
whose assault each state must be forever on the watch’ (1915: 607).
When Mead returns to these issues in the late 1920s, he still seeks to approach
the problems of international relations and warfare from a scientific social psycho-
logical perspective. In ‘National-Mindedness and International-Mindedness,’ he
reiterates his earlier account of the ‘hostile impulse’ in order to describe the social
psychological instinct responsible for ‘the spiritual exaltation of wartime patriotism’
(1929: 393). There is, however, one crucial innovation in this later analysis. Lan-
guage, as a rational cooperative activity, is seen as a prominent mechanism for the re-
solution of international conflicts: it is by means of intelligent deliberation that
contending parties should resolve their disputes. In Mead’s own words, over against
the instinctive hostile impulse, one should resort to ‘the power which language has
conferred upon us, of not only seeing ourselves as others see us but also of address-
ing ourselves in terms of the common ideas and functions which an organized society
makes possible’ (1929: 395). Retaining the evolutionary perspective that character-
izes his theory of phylogenesis, Mead argues that nationalism is a historically recent
phenomenon by which men suddenly realized that they belonged to communities
that transcended their families and clans. In this sense, ‘national mindedness’ is to be
conceived of as a conversation with a ‘generalized other’, more general than previous
forms of human association, but less general than the form idealized by Mead. As he
puts it: ‘Can we carry on a conversation in international terms?’ (1997 [1934]: 271).
According to Mead, the ‘moral equivalent of war’, to paraphrase James, is to be
found in the socially acquired capacity for rational linguistic expression of ideas,
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rather than in some fundamental social impulse. It is a rationalist and international-
ist solution that Mead proposes.
Language, Science, and Democracy
This said, Mead’s contributions to contemporary social and political theory are not
limited to his writings on international relations, industrialization, immigration,
and other civic issues. In fact, his communicative theory of society comprises a nor-
mative conception of democracy and an ethical theory that deserve a closer scru-
tiny. What connects these two elements of Mead’s political thinking is the ideal of
a political community whose citizens are able to maintain social order by means of
the exchange of rational arguments that leads to mutual understanding. I will thus
devote the remainder of this article to the analysis of the socio-linguistic founda-
tions of Mead’s political and moral theory, the aspect of his thinking that most
clearly distinguishes his contributions from Dewey’s. Mead’s discussion of the vari-
ous ‘moods of language’, as far as I know a completely overlooked element of his
thinking, can be found in a set of student notes taken by G.E.M. Shelburg in the
winter quarter of 1927.18
I should start by noting that these notes differ significantly from those
taken by W.T. Lillie in the winter quarter of 1928, a professional stenographer
hired by Alvin Carus, from which Charles Morris constructed Mind, Self and
Society.19 In the Shelburg notes, one finds a whole new perspective on language
and self-consciousness from the one discussed in Mind, Self and Society. Firstly, we
have the imperative mood, a form of communication originally associated with a
situation where social relations were regulated through force and coercion. In the
course of social evolution, the imperative mood came to be the expression of the
socially binding nature of obligations and duties (Mead, 1982: 160). Following
this initial form of language, and associated with the physiological development of
the central nervous system, two other moods of language have emerged – the sub-
junctive, associated with deliberation, and the optative, related to decision-making
situations. The individual self could thereby express to himself as to the others
alternative courses of action, which imply that he enjoys a certain degree of auton-
omy. Seen as the most advanced stage of the evolutionary process of the human
species, the indicative mood of language paves the way to the overcoming of the
individual vs social dichotomy. In a situation where social relations were governed
by superior force, the imperative mood of language expressed the non-existence
of a ‘generalized other’ that could exert social control; this all changes when the
subjunctive, optative, and indicative moods of language allow for the emergence
of self-conscious individuals, more autonomous than their ancestors, yet members
of their communities to an extent unknown in the history of the human species.
The evolutionary character of the successive moods of language is reflected in the
ontogenetic process of evolution too. As the most advanced moods of language
emerge in the course of social evolution, the successive stages of psychological
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development show individuals increasingly capable of apprehending meanings in
their fullest generality.
The specifically political implications of this line of argument are far-reaching.
The evolution of language accompanies the social evolution from a stage where one
commands and the other obeys or refuses to obey, to a stage where individuals are
no longer ‘forced to carry out the response by the social suggestion’ (1982: 161),
being able to select their courses of action, in an autonomous and cooperative fash-
ion. Moreover, consciousness emerges only with this subjunctive mood of language
for, as Mead explains, the central nervous system ‘stands for the ability to present
alternatives by introducing a temporal dimension into action. To get the different
possibilities into the present situation, one can suggest the other alternatives. Here,
then, is deliberation, conversation, an inner forum or council’ (1982: 161). The out-
come of such a deliberative and rational process is the emergence of an indicative
‘mood of language’, in which alternative courses of action are identified by the social
actor. To carry out an act, however, the individual must take the attitude of the group
given the conventional nature of language – ‘one is always speaking to audiences or
communities, expressing universals that are significant to others’ (1982: 161).
In this light, both Mead’s conception of deliberative democracy and his com-
municative ethics gain added significance. In the first case, any theory of democracy
revolves around a certain notion of citizenship. However, this concept is treated only
in passing in Mead’s published political writings. To find his conception of citizen-
ship one has to resort, once again, to his unpublished manuscripts. Indeed, in the
unpublished essay ‘How Can a Sense of Citizenship be Secured?’ (n.d.-a), Mead
introduces citizenship as the political correlate of the self’s social character in a rather
Aristotelian tone. The continued, committed, and disinterested exercise of the rights
and duties associated with the membership in a political community is the condition
for a truly democratic society. Only a society where all the citizens exercise their rights
and duties diligently and to the full extent of their rational abilities meets Mead’s
communicative ideal of a free and democratic society. Furthermore, only if all particu-
lar interests are given equal attention do political decision-making processes ex-
press the ‘common good’. Thus far, Mead’s conception of citizenship, with its
civic-republican emphasis on the virtues of democratic participation, is not that dif-
ferent from John Dewey’s, his life-long friend.20 However, Mead supersedes Dewey’s
radical democratic conception when he, drawing a parallel between life in a social
group and life in a political community, observes that, in both cases, individuals act
in the context of institutions whose structural nature is beyond their consciousness.
Only when conflicts occur do individuals, either as social actors or as political citizens,
gain consciousness of the fundamental social values embodied in institutions like the
family, the school, or the parliament. Arguing along similar lines to the Shelburg
notes, Mead then goes on to suggest that we ‘get hardly more immediate meaning
out of the constant process of the evolution of social institutions than we do out of
the processes of dialectical changes which take place in our mouths . . . as great laws
of speech’ (n.d.-a: 10–11, italics added).
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Taking this last remark into account, it should not be difficult to understand
Mead’s insistence on the communicative nature of his ethical theory. Again, it is
around the notion of ‘reconstruction’, only this time ‘moral reconstruction’, that
Mead constructs his theory of moral problem-solving. As he explains in the 1923
article ‘Scientific Method and the Moral Sciences’, both the ethical ends and the
means to attain them can be subject to ‘restatement and reconstruction’ by the
‘intelligent method of science’ (1923: 244).21 Mead’s theory of solving moral prob-
lems, despite never having been explicitly connected to his analysis of the ‘moods
of language’, shows, nonetheless, a communicative character, as well as some pro-
ceduralist and universalistic features. The proceduralism of Mead’s ethics, heavily
influenced by his conception of science, derives from its emphasis not on the def-
inition of a determined final end that is supposed to motivate moral action (he rejects
defining the ‘common good’), but on the definition of the procedures of a demo-
cratic and experimental moral method. The universal character and the commu-
nicative nature of Mead’s ethics are entwined points. Both the research scientist and
the critical moral agent have to take into consideration all the relevant facts. The
solution of moral problems lies in being able to have the wider perspective possible
so that all the conflicting points of view, interests, or ends are fully appreciated. Since
bearing in mind all the perspectives is ultimately a problem of communication,
Mead’s ethics are necessarily communicative: every part in conflict must be able to
express his viewpoints in an intelligible way for all the others. Hence, his theory of
ethics is universalistic given its orientation to the rational perspective of the ‘gener-
alized other’, and, in particular, to the ‘rational community that is represented in the
so-called universe of discourse’ (Mead, 1997 [1934]: 202).
In a similar way, Mead suggests that the experimental method of science
and democratic politics are internally connected given their reliance upon the
same communicative type of rationality. Both in a scientific discussion in a research
laboratory and in a political discussion in a parliament, the human ability to com-
municate in a rational fashion is the basis upon which the coordination of the con-
duct of individuals, either as scientists or as citizens, is carried out. To the social
scientist is reserved the function of analyzing these situations by reconstructing
the ‘great laws of speech’ both from a phylogenetic and from an ontogenetic per-
spective. From this point of view, it is only natural that Mead is skeptical about a
merely quantitative analysis of democratic politics. Much more important than the
‘clumsy method of registering public sentiment which the ballot box affords in a
democracy’ (Mead, 1923: 244) are, to Mead as to Dewey, the continued and
informed debates by a cognitively competent and civically engaged citizenry. In a
book published shortly after Mead’s article, The Public and Its Problems (1984
[1927]), Dewey subscribes to a similar position to the one argued by Mead. Dewey
writes: 
Majority rule, just as majority rule, is as foolish as its critics charge it with
being. But it never is merely majority rule. … The essential need, in other
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words, is the improvement of the methods and conditions of debate, dis-
cussion and persuasion. That is the problem of the public.
(1984 [1927]: 365)
This pragmatist understanding of democratic politics is of central importance for
Habermas’s discursive conception of deliberative democracy. Habermas acknow-
ledges this fact in his latest major political work, Between Facts and Norms, where
he quotes approvingly Dewey’s words (see Habermas, 1996b [1992]: 304), but
says nothing of Mead’s writings on the same subject.
Habermas thus fails to see that the communicative nature of Mead’s theory
of society gains, in the field of democratic political theory, a deliberative tone. In
my view, failing to see this amounts to failing to grasp the very core of Mead’s intel-
lectual system: the scientific reconstruction, both in the history of the human
species and in the history of the child, of the communicative dimension of human
rationality. This social theoretical contribution also helps one to distinguish Mead’s
work from Dewey’s. Unlike Dewey, Mead consistently sought to develop a scien-
tific approach to the problems of the ‘social or moral order’. Such an approach
makes use of the experimental method of science in order to provide a social psy-
chological explanation of moral and political phenomena. Resorting to his social
theory of the self, Mead claims that the content of moral acts can be universalized
insofar as one recognizes their eminent social character. A moral end is reached
only when an individual is able to identify his motive with the common good of
the community in which he lives. The difference between good and evil stems from
the social character of the self since a moral end is good when it leads to the real-
ization of the individual as a social being. Social psychology can illuminate moral
philosophical questions, Mead contends, for ‘it is as social beings that we are moral
beings’.22 This line of argument is a significant demonstration that Mead conceives
of social psychology and moral philosophy as closely connected fields of research,
much in accordance with my thesis that his thinking has a systematic nature.
Moreover, in the basis of Mead’s argument on the interconnectedness between the
social and the moral orders there lies the scientific attitude of the research scientist.
Granting the perspective of the scientist the status of a model of impartiality, imper-
sonality, and objectivity, he suggests that moral conflicts can be resolved insofar as
all values and interests are taken into consideration. This implies a process of recon-
struction of the self, which becomes a larger self by assuming the attitude of the
‘generalized other’, which is also a moral reconstruction. Hence Mead’s moral dic-
tum, itself a reformulation of Kant’s categorical imperative – ‘One should act with
reference to all the interests that are involved’.23 Mead’s favored moral procedure
is, then, an application of the procedure of modern experimental science to the
problematic moral segment of the ‘world that is there’.
The ultimate goal of a science of politics and morals is the resolution of
concrete ethical problems. Exactly how this science is to be intertwined with a sci-
entific theory of the psyche was something Mead felt the need to explain to his
JOURNAL OF CLASSICAL SOCIOLOGY VOL 7(3)304
291-314 JCS-082083.qxd  8/10/07  2:45 PM  Page 304
 at CAMBRIDGE UNIV LIBRARY on February 3, 2016jcs.sagepub.comDownloaded from 
students in his lectures on social psychology. In fact, the social theoretical basis of
Mead’s moral and political thought can be grasped in scattered remarks through-
out Mind, Self and Society. To begin with, insofar as Mead’s conception of partici-
pative democracy is a specific kind of social cooperative activity, it is closely related
to the mastery of a natural language (see Mead, 1997 [1934]: 267–8). At this
point, it is instructive to recall C. Wright Mills’s Sociology and Pragmatism (1966),
where one can find a sharp criticism of the pragmatists’ scientific approach to
social reform and moral reconstruction. Mills points to the fact that a social the-
ory of the mind was ‘the mudsill of the liberal psychology of Dewey’ (1966: 448).
Without a sound social theory, the social and political reformist activities of the
pragmatists lacked a legitimate theoretical basis. If this might be a fair critique of
Dewey’s social psychology – one that Mead (1994) himself was ready to make –
the fact remains, as Mills recognizes in the ‘Postscript’ to Sociology and Pragma-
tism, that his sociological analysis of pragmatism did not include an extensive
treatment of Mead’s social theory (1966: 464). It is my contention that if it did,
Mills’s judgment would not be so harsh on the pragmatists.
Conclusions
In this article, I have argued that Habermas’s appropriation of Mead, though the-
oretically sophisticated, might nevertheless be criticized for emphasizing only those
aspects which are immediately relevant for his theoretical strategy. In particular,
Habermas’s criticism of Mead supposed ‘idealism’ is not sensitive to the true scope
and relevance of his contributions to contemporary social and political theory. While
Mead does not make use of a functionalist systems theory to analyze politics, war-
fare, and the economic aspects of modernization, I contend that Habermas’s critique
of his ‘idealism’ is not warranted, for one fundamental reason. Behind Habermas’s
claim one finds his theoretical option to proceed ‘reconstructively, that is, unhistor-
ically’ (1987 [1981]: 383).24 This is the reason why Habermas looks into the past in
search for exemplary usages of his own ideas: such an anachronism entails, I argue,
serious theoretical implications. For instance, one is not able to appreciate that the
dynamic-systemic aspects of society – what Habermas calls the ‘material reproduction
of society’ – can be analyzed by means of a theoretical perspective that transcends the
idealist–materialist dichotomy. Such a theoretical perspective, first created by the
classical pragmatists and now being developed by their contemporary heirs,25
points to a unitary conception of action underpinned by a radical democratic ideal
of communication that is at least as promising as Habermas’s attempt to reconcile a
functionalist systems theory with a theory of action. In other words, a historical
reconstruction of Mead not only shows that to charge him of ‘idealism’ is but a con-
sequence of one’s own theoretical agenda, but also that Mead and the other prag-
matists have developed the fundamentals of a theory of human action that is as
adequate to study large-scale social and economic phenomena as it is to analyze face-
to-face interactions.
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I believe a historically minded reconstruction of a sociological classic can
supplement, and even sometimes correct, presentist interpretations of the past.
This is not to say that Habermas should be criticized for not taking into account
all of Mead’s published and unpublished papers. Rather, my contention is that
Habermas’s presentist interpretation, even if it allowed him to recognize some of
Mead’s contributions, thus granting him a place among sociology’s founders, pre-
vented him from acknowledging the full scope of his contributions. Pace Merton
(1949), theory and history of theory are then but different faces of the same coin.
The relevance of an author’s contributions can be established only in a theoretical
way; yet the factual accuracy of such a theoretical task can only benefit from a his-
torically minded reconstruction of its subject-matter. In the case of Mead, as I tried
to demonstrate, among his most relevant (and neglected) contributions to today’s
social and political theory is the notion that a deliberative kind of participatory
democracy is internally linked to a conception of science as a puzzle-solving activ-
ity. As a matter of fact, most of the best current scholarship on deliberative democ-
racy and pragmatism makes exactly this claim.
A second, related contention of the paper was to show the centrality of the
category of ‘public discourse’ for Mead’s social and political thought. Indeed, Mead’s
deliberative theory of democracy places its faith not on the skills of the professional
party members, but on the wisdom of the informed layman. Mead’s model of
democracy is not centered on the state; on the contrary, it presupposes a pluralistic
and decentralized set of political institutions of which the state is simply the one oper-
ating at the national level. Below the state, there are the municipal authorities, whose
importance Mead never ceased to emphasize, and above the state there should be an
international institutional body able to arbitrate and settle the conflicts between
national states. At each level, the existence of an active public sphere is of pivotal
importance: the denser the communicative network between the individual mem-
bers, the more democratic and effective the influence of that sphere of political ac-
tivity. It is in such an ‘informed citizenry’ that Mead finds the ultimate source of
legitimacy of a constitutional democratic regime. When Mead speaks of ‘institution-
alized revolution’, he is drawing the borders between the piecemeal reformism of the
pragmatists and the revolutionary means of the socialists. Living at a time which
would be later known as the Progressive Era, Mead embodied some of the intellec-
tual traits of his generation. What he saw as the distinctive feature of the philosoph-
ical work of his friend Dewey, T.V. Smith, in accordance with my interpretation,
identifies as the motto of Mead’s own social philosophy – ‘amelioration through
understanding’ (1931: 369).
Let us now elaborate a little further on Smith’s happy formulation. Mead’s
social reformism, as I have tried to show, is based upon his scientific social psych-
ology, whose central conceptual tool is the mechanism of ‘taking the attitude of the
other’. To ‘understand’, in Mead’s view, means to be able to put oneself in another’s
shoes; hence, to ‘ameliorate society through understanding’ means to be able to cre-
atively reconstruct the social and cultural setting where one lives by assuming the
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attitude of the ‘generalized other’. Social criticism is, from this point of view, not
only something legitimate for citizens to undertake, but also and fundamentally a
major source of social progress and change. A consistent criticism of our own social
and cultural horizon presupposes, therefore, a communicative type of rationality
that implies an ideal set of claims. As Mead puts it, ‘these larger patterns afford a
basis for the criticism of existing conditions and in an even unconscious way tend to
realize themselves in social conduct’ (1930: 705–6). Social reconstruction is, then,
the route open to everyone willing to apply the scientific method to moral and social
problems. Science’s practice of rational exchange of arguments between equals, in
which all facts must be taken into consideration and subjected to empirical testing,
and in which every solution is inescapably provisional, is the model upon which
Mead draws to conceive of democracy. The cognitive and linguistic nature of his
conception of democratic politics provides compelling evidence in support of this
thesis. If ‘science and democracy’ is a common theme amongst classical pragmatists,
it is to Mead that we owe the only communicative social theory that systematically
connects science’s problem-solving nature to democracy’s deliberative character by
means of social psychology that establishes the social nature of the human self. Such
is one of Mead’s seminal contributions to contemporary social and political theory.
From this vantage point, C. Wright Mills’s aforementioned criticism that
American pragmatism fails to develop a social theory that sustains its political pro-
posals seems to be, at least when applied to Mead, unduly harsh. It is true that
Mead never provided a fully developed account of such a theory. But the fact
remains that the basic tenets of a social conception of the self were produced, and
that Mead explicitly made use of this social psychological model in his political
writings. The relevance of this social theoretical argument for political theory
stems from its emphasis on language. The deliberative kind of democracy en-
dorsed by Mead, Dewey, and other pragmatists is given, especially by Mead, a ‘socio-
linguistic foundation’ that is of great interest from the point of view of his possible
contributions to contemporary social and political theory.
In other words, if Dewey’s political thought can be criticized for not being
sustained by a social theory that provides a model of explanation of human action
and rationality, the same criticism cannot be leveled at Mead. Among the classical
pragmatists, it was Mead who developed in a more consistent fashion a social the-
oretical foundation for his moral and political theories. It would be an anachron-
ism to suggest that Mead ‘anticipated’ by over fifty years the deliberative turn in
democratic political theory. It would be an even greater error, though, not to rec-
ognize that his analysis of the late 1920s comprises the conceptual elements to
which, already in the 1990s, political thinkers resorted to produce their deliber-
ative proposals. This is precisely what intellectual history has to offer to social and
political theory building: long-forgotten ideas that, if adequately integrated in
contemporary social and political theory, are able offer us the possibility of engag-
ing in dialogue with our predecessors about the best way to solve the problems
we wish to tackle.
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Notes
With sincere appreciation I thank Donald Levine, Hans Joas, Patrick Baert, and Darin Weinberg for
thoughtful and challenging comments on, or conversations about, earlier versions of this article, as well
as for inspiration and support. I also wish to thank the JCS reviewer’s insightful comments.
1. I am referring to David L. Miller, Hans Joas, Harold Orbach, Gary Alan Cook, and Andrew Feffer.
2. See the University of Chicago Settlement Board Minutes and Reports, held at the Mary McDowell
and the University of Chicago Settlement Papers, and The City Club Bulletin, published by the City
Club of Chicago and held at the Regenstein Library of the University of Chicago.
3. It is worth noting that authors like Gisela Hinkle claim Habermas’s critical social theory ‘invites sym-
bolic interactionists to undertake a new reflection which recognizes and takes seriously cultural
heterogeneity and the multiple rationalities of a modern global society, one in which rationality
conceived communicatively is the topic of critical research’ (Hinkle, 1992: 331).
4. However, Habermas’s most detailed treatment of Mead to date is to be found in his book
Postmetaphysical Thinking (1992 [1988]). In a chapter entitled ‘Individuation through Socialization:
On George Herbert Mead’s Theory of Subjectivity,’ Habermas addresses the problem of individual-
ity throughout the history of philosophy, presenting Mead as the first author to have reconciled
individuation with socialization.
5. A tradition inaugurated by Weber, and developed by Lukács and by the Frankfurt School.
6. For an account that also emphasizes Mead’s attempt to reconcile Hegel and Kant, see Aboulafia
(1995).
7. Joas similarly notes that Mead’s ‘works cover the entire spectrum ranging from the dialogue of
significant gestures to complex scientific or public political discussions’ (1991: 107).
8. Dmitri Shalin, possibly misled by the title of an early essay of Mead, contends that despite his ‘admir-
ation for Wilson, Mead would remain loyal to the Republican party throughout his life’ (1988: 920).
This is by no means a correct description of Mead’s political allegiances. Mead’s admiration for
Wilson was not an oddity, but the very expression of his sympathy for the Democratic Party. As his
personal correspondence shows, Mead never supported a single Republican presidential candidate;
quite the contrary.
9. Social settlements first appeared in England in the 1870s, as a joint church–university initiative.
What distinguishes a social settlement from other social institutions is the fact that its workers
actually share their daily lives with the citizens they are supposed to help.
Once again, unpublished manuscripts reveal their importance. In effect, the most complete account
of Mead’s view on the social settlement movement is not the brief discussion one finds in ‘The Social
Settlement, Its Basis and Function’ (1907–8), but the unpublished essay ‘On the Role of Social
Settlements’ (n.d.-c), where he discusses at great length his views on this social movement. One of
the very few analyses of Mead’s views on the settlement movement is Cook (1993: 99–104); unfor-
tunately, and even if this is one of the most historically minded studies of Mead to date, Cook’s
analysis it is solely based on the short published above-mentioned article.
10. Mead defines ‘social control’ as a form of self-criticism that, ‘far from tending to crush out the
human individual or to obliterate his self-conscious individuality, is, on the contrary, actually con-
stitutive of and inextricably associated with that individuality’ (1997 [1934]: 255).
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11. One of the very few texts devoted to this point is Campbell (1995).
12. ‘. . . what America ought to insist upon is the right to continue her life in the international soci-
ety, while she remains out of that war in which she has refused to join’ (Mead to Irene Mead,
February 18, 1917, Mead Papers, box 1, folder 14).
13. ‘I have never felt so strongly the necessity of America’s fighting as I do now. The democratic issue
that we fight for should be made clear not only by the president but also by the people’ (Mead
to Henry Mead, March 7, 1918, Mead Papers, box 1, folder 15).
14. This essay was originally published in the journal Survey in 1915. I was able to determine the exact
date this article was written because in a letter to his son Henry, dating from January 21, 1915, Mead
makes the following remark: ‘I have written an article on Militarism which I was asked to write for the
Survey’ (Mead Papers, box 1, folder 8). During my archival work at Chicago I managed to locate its
original version. Wrongly filed as an unpublished paper, it was held in the Addenda, box 3, folder 1,
under the title of ‘Militarism and Nationalism’, and includes an unpublished handwritten conclusion.
15. Mead’s son, Henry, had military training in the Chicago area in the second semester of 1917 and
joined the war effort in early 1918. The correspondence between Mead and his son in this period
can be found in Mead Papers, box 1, folder 9.
16. Mead announces the discussion of the ‘attitudes of religion, patriotism, and team work’, but the
selection of the student notes made by Morris includes only his discussion of the other two atti-
tudes (see 1997 [1934]: 273). For an account of Mead’s views on patriotism in that book, one has
either to go back to an earlier section, namely to the analysis of the function performed by the
sense of superiority for the realization of the self (see 1997 [1934]: 207–9), or to go forward to
the discussion of social conflict in a later section (see 1997 [1934]: 306).
17. According to Joas, while Simmel conceives of war as a ‘deeply moving existential experience of
an ecstatic feeling of security that liberates our personality from old inhibitions’, Durkheim, in his
sociology of religion, describes ‘collective effervescence’ experiences as a ‘group ecstasy that has
the function of shaping identity and creating social bounds’ (2003: 65). Oddly, Joas fails to extend
this parallel to the case of Mead’s thesis of the fusion of the ‘I’ and the ‘me’.
18. This set of notes was edited and published by David Miller in The Individual and the Social Self (Mead,
1982). However, contrary to the indications he provides in the introduction to that book, these notes
are not from the spring quarter of 1927 nor do they cover only sixty pages. They were actually taken
by Shelburg in the winter quarter of that year, and run to over 100 pages (Mead, 1927). I will quote
from the volume edited by Miller since it is available to the wider public, but I must say that his edi-
torial work is far from being reliable.
19. These notes can be found in Mead Papers, box 2, folders 4–13. In the last page of the original copy
of this transcript, one can read ‘Reported by W.T. Lillie’, which is, as Harold Orbach pointed out to
me, the typical phraseology used by stenographers at that time. It is to Orbach’s long years of archival
research, which go back to the mid-1970s, that we owe the true story behind Mind, Self and Society.
20. For the most complete account of the civic republican nature of Chicago philosophical pragma-
tism, see Feffer (1993).
21. Such a connection between science and morals can already be seen in the earlier essays ‘The Social
Self’, where Mead states for the first time the possibility of solving problematic moral situations by
means of a creative rational moral reconstruction that supersedes the disintegrating moral conflicts,
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leading to moral growth (1913: 379), and ‘The Psychology of Punitive Justice’, where he equates
moral growth with the advance that takes place ‘in bringing to consciousness the larger social
whole within which hostile attitudes pass over into self-assertions that are functional instead of
destructive’ (1918: 581).
22. Mead Papers, box 7, folder 4.
23. Mead Papers, box 7, folder 4.
24. According to Habermas, rational reconstruction is a pure form of theoretical knowledge that is gen-
erated within a reflexive attitude, and as such it abstracts itself from particular historical contexts.
(See Habermas, 1998 [1972]: 377–80.)
25. The names of Robert Antonio (1989), Hans Joas (1996 [1992]), and Dmitri Shalin (1992) come
to mind.
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